Headline hostage

MARITIME security, which has been busy clocking up column inches in the trade press, has finally caught the eye of the wider public media too. Two articles in a recent edition of a UK broadsheet newspaper made interesting reading, not because they demonstrated any in-depth understanding of maritime security issues and the terrorist threat to global shipping, but because the angle that each article took appeared to have been chosen more for sensational purposes than any other.

Indeed, a pattern seems to be developing across a wide range of media commentators towards highlighting the inevitability of terrorist attacks at sea or by sea, giving rise to the implication that they are somehow more imminent now than before.

The reality is that the terrorist threat to the maritime domain is not new and neither is the security risk faced by the industry in other forms of threat. Terrorists and criminals have been exploiting the vulnerability inherent in the operational dynamics of the shipping industry for many years. Piracy has been around for as long as anyone can remember but rarely gets public media coverage, and it has been almost twenty years since members of the Palestine Liberation Front hijacked the Italian cruiseship Achille Lauro. Even in this case, most commentary overlooks the fact that the vessel was only hijacked when the terrorists were discovered cleaning their weapons (in preparation for an attack in Ashdod). Up to that point, their aim was to slip off the ship and into Israel illicitly.

In more recent times, there have been terrorist attacks on both naval and commercial vessels. In October 2000, the US warship USS Cole was severely damaged by a suicide fast-boat attack while on a diplomatic courtesy stopover in Aden, Yemen. In October 2002, the French-flagged vlcc Limburg was damaged by another suicide fast-boat attack, again in waters off the Yemen. Many other planned attacks on maritime targets have been avoided or disrupted by security services around the world.

The maritime world has lived with security threats, at various levels, for many years. What is new is that, through the ISPS Code, the shipping industry is being forced to take proactive steps to actually address the threats. This is not to say that nothing had been done previously. Some legislation existed at a national level, such as the UK’s Aviation and Maritime Security Act (AMSA) 1990. However, most efforts had been focused on the passenger shipping sector.

Unfortunately, when the ISPS Code was finally introduced, it was met with inertia from a significant proportion of the industry and, as anyone involved knows, it has been a slow grind to implement it before the compliance date of July 1 this year. On reflection, this was no surprise, even if it was much to the chagrin of the regulators. Those to whom the ISPS Code applies were simply unconvinced of the need for it, or the benefits to the industry that might accrue as a result of it.

With media speculation running high on the likelihood and imminence of a ‘maritime spectacular’, it is possible to identify why many in the industry were and still are to be convinced there are issues to be addressed. Very few commentators understand the realities of the vulnerability of the maritime domain to security threats. There are few people with enough credible experience to provide informed comment and opinion on what is a complex subject. For various reasons, there were even fewer before the ISPS Code was introduced. As a result, when the industry sought out experts who were able to help them in meeting the challenges of introducing an effective, yet cost-efficient security regime, in the main they found consultants who could only conceptualise the possibilities of a catastrophic maritime terrorist incident, but were eager to trade security services on the fear that such an incident invoked. Little wonder then that many others, taking a more phlegmatic approach, remained sceptical of the value of enhanced security measures, particularly when assessing the added organisational and financial burden it seemed to impose.

The implementation of the ISPS Code and the pressing requirement for compliance has featured in both trade and public press articles, more recently on the back of highlighting the maritime security risks at the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. News stories have been broadcast featuring the concerns over the links between piracy in South-East Asia and terrorism. In principle, there is little to lament about the awareness that is created by such a public discussion of terrorism or criminal activity in the maritime world. Indeed, a better appreciation of what it actually takes to carry the bulk of world trade across the oceans, and the risks faced by the industry in doing so, should be encouraged. However, while the maritime world works hard to come to terms with its new security obligations, it should do as much as it can to avoid becoming a hostage to headlines and sources of superficial information that do more to scaremonger than they do inform. An appropriate and proportional reaction is the only means to ensure that the terrorists do not win this part of the battle.